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Moral Hazard in Health Insurance: Are ConsumerDirected Plans the Answer?
Douglass Farnsworth,J.D., M.B.A.*

I. INTRODUCTION

Insurance exists to spread risks of unpredictable events over a larger
group of individuals and businesses. By pooling the premiums of multiple
insureds, insurance is able to reduce the financial uncertainty or risk of each
individual. Individuals being naturally risk-averse, the decreased risk
achieved through insurance increases social wellbeing.
In the arena of health insurance, an insurer is able to pool sufficient
premium dollars of many insureds to cover the expected costs of treatment
for those insureds, plus administrative costs and a given level of profit. The
problem arises in the way that such reduction in risk of payment changes
the behavior of individual insureds, who ultimately control which provider
treats the patient and which treatments will be incurred. Because the
individual knows that her treatment costs will be covered by insurance, she
does not spend that money as carefully as she would if it were her own. In
fact, studies have shown a positive correlation between the presence and
scope of health insurance and the demand for medical services.'
Most employees have health insurance coverage through an employer,
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group ophthalmology practice in Mobile, Alabama prior to working for 3M Company in St.
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1. See, e.g.. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertaint , and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care,
53 AM. ECON. REv. 941, 961-62 (1963).
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wvhich is an accident of history, an unintended consequence of government
regulation that has persisted. During World War II, employers were
constrained by federal wage controls, while at the same time the amount of
money being pumped into production for the war effort meant that
employers needed a way to retain productive employees .
Because
employee benefits aside from wages were not controlled, many employers
began offering health insurance.3 Tax benefits to both employer and
employees made this offering stick - the employer could deduct expenses
for medical insurance as a compensation expense, but the value of the
co\erage was not included in employees' taxable income.4 This tax benefit
also led to medical coverage that expanded in scope from the initial
hospital-only coverage offered by employers during World War II5 to the
comprehensive coverage many enjoy today, as employers sought ways to
shift compensation dollars to such insurance.6 This also led employers to
provide plans with low deductibles to provide compensation through this
tax-benefited route rather than the more heavily-taxed cash compensation. 7
While much of the money employees receive in the form of medical
insurance is money they otherwise would have received as higher wages,
once that money is spent on providing medical insurance, employees tend
to treat it as other peoples' money.'
In recent years, high rates of increase in the cost of providing this
coverage have led insurers and employers to look for ways to reduce the
perceived freewheeling spending by their employees. Annual increases
have been in double-digits for several years and are only now beginning to
slo\v,. 9 It remains unclear what portion of these increases is due to moral
2.

DAVID R. HENDERSO\, HOOVER INST., THE PERVERSE ECONO\IICS OF HEALTH CARE

-VD How WE CAN Fix IT 6 (1994).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Telephone Interview with Tami Tolzman, Senior Administrator, 3M Co. Total Health
Management (June 29, 2005). 3M Co. initially offered hospital-only coverage in 1942 at the
then-highly-competitive rate of up to $30 per day, for which the employees paid no
premium. In comparison, today 3M's base PPO medical plan has 90% coverage for most

senices after a $300 deductible, with a premium for individual coverage at S20 per month.
6. HENDERSON, supra note 2, at 6-7.
7. Id. at8.

8. Id.
9. Hewitt Associates LLC, Hewitt's 2004 Future Health Care Expectations Survey
Overview 6-7 (Oct. 2004) [hereinafter Health Care Expectations 2004]. Average annual

percentage increases since 2000 have been as follows - 2000: 12%; 2001: 15%: 2002: 16%;
2003: 13%; 2004: 12%. A separate survey by Towers Perrin projects only an 8% increase
for 2005, but this represents a per-employee average increase of $582 for PPO plans, which
could have been significantly higher were it not for continuing efforts by employers to
manage such increases. JOE CONWAY, TOWERS PERRIN, TOWERS PERRIN PROJECTS AN 8%
INCREASE IN F MPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH CARE COSTS FOR 2005, 7 (Oct. 6, 2004).
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hazard and the disconnect between the true cost of medical care and the cost
borne out-of-pocket by employees"1' Because employers, on average, pay
81% of the total cost of employee medical insurance, such increases cannot
be continually absorbed.'
Therefore, employers have implemented
increased cost-sharing in the forms of higher deductibles and coinsurance or
copayments.'1 In addition, an expanding number of employers are offering
consumer-directed health plans as a way to increase employee sensitivity to
the true costs of medical services and thereby create a sense of
consumerism."
This paper will examine this "moral hazard" problem with health
insurance, beginning with Part II,
which describes moral hazard and its
effect on patients as consumers of medical services. Part III then explores
the methods that insurers and employers have used to reduce the costincreasing effects of moral hazard on medical insurance. Because a
majority of insureds under the age of sixty-five are covered through
employers, this paper will concentrate on the actions of employers in
containing cost increases. Part IV discusses so-called "consumer-directed
health plans," including what they are and whether such plans may be an
answer to the problem of cost increases generally and to moral hazard
specifically. Part V wxill then conclude with recommendations based on the
author's personal experience with these issues as well as what has been
learned in researching this article.
II. MORAL HAZARD - WHAT IT IS AND THE EFFECTS OF HEALTH
INSURANCE

A. What Is Moral Hazard?

Moral hazard, simply put, is the tendency of an individual to behave
differently in regards to a particular event depending on the presence of
insurance.'4 For instance, once an insurable event such as an auto theft is
10. Chee-Wah Cheah & D.P. Doessel, Welfare Cost and Health Insurance. .1
DisaggregatedApproach Using Dualit' Theory and -lustralian Data, 26 App. ECON. 567,

568 (Jun. 1994). Estimates of the scope of the impact of moral hazard on health insurance in
the United States, based on RAND and other data, range from S37-60 billion in 1994 dollars.
A separate study showed that between 1965-1981, the increase in total health care spending
attributable only to increases in utilization was S67.1 billion (in 1981 dollars). John R. Virts
& George W. Wilson, The Determinants of Rising Health Care Costs. Some Empirical
Assessments, in INCENTIVES VS. CONTROLS IN HEALTH POLICY: BROADENING THE DEBATE 78-

79 (Jack A. Meyer ed., 1985).
11. CONWAY, supra note 9.
12.

Health CareExpectations 2004, supra note 9,at 4512-13.

13.

Id.

14.

See generally Arrow, supra note 1.
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insured against, the insured will tend to be more careless, such as leaving
the car unlocked or parking in higher-theft areas. Similarly, it has been
shown that where a house is insured against fire, the prevalence of
accidental fire attributable to carelessness increases.15
In the context of health insurance, moral hazard is manifested in the
tendency of individuals to increase utilization of medical services paid for
by insurance compared to those services not covered. 6 As insurance
coverage increases, demand for services covered by such insurance likewise
increases. Specifically, moral hazard has been shown to vary with the
copayment, or portion of the medical bill paid by the insured-patient.' 7 For
example, a person who contracts the flu, but whose insurance has a
deductible of $1000, is far less likely to see the doctor than a person who
has 100% coverage after a $10 copayment.
B. What Causes Moral Hazard?
Moral hazard is caused by several economic principles and theories.
First, economic theory is based primarily on the assumption that individuals
act in their own best economic interest." s It is therefore completely rational
that for insured services, as the marginal cost of medical services is reduced
the patient will tend to consume more.' 9 In fact, studies have continually
shown that after controlling for health status, those who have health
insurance consume more medical services than those without insurance.2 °
As the example above indicates, the person with the $1000 deductible
would only decide to visit the doctor when the expected utility of that visit
(or the expected avoided harm) exceeds the cost. This follows traditional
ecnomic theory that rational individuals act when the marginal utility
(benefit to that individual) is greater than the marginal cost of that action. 2
A second cause of moral hazard in health insurance is the inequity of
information between patients and providers. By the nature of their
specialized training and experience, physicians have an enormous amount
of information regarding treatment options, risks, and prognoses, none of
which is completely shared with patients.22 Patients may not possess

15.
16.
17.

Arrow, supra note 1, at 961.
Id.
See, e.g., Marcos Vera-Hemandez, Structural Estimation of a Principal-Agent
Ilodel: Mlral Hazard in Medical Insurance, 34 RAND J. ECON. 670 (2003).
18. Eric French & Kirti Kamboj, Analyzing the Relationship Between Health Insurance,
Health Costs, and Health Care Utilization, 26 ECON. PERSP. 60, 60 (Sept. 22. 2002).
19. Id. at 65.

20.

Id. at 65-66.

21.

Id.
See generally SHERRY A. GLIED, Health Insurance and Market FailureSince Arrow,

22.
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sufficient information to even determine whether an episode of care is
appropriate or whether self-care will be adequate. This contributes to moral
hazard in that patients who are understandably ignorant regarding their
options must put substantial trust in the physician.
Furthermore, it should
not be overlooked that the physician cannot completely set aside his own
self-interests in billing for treatment. 4 This can be particularly true with
so-called "dynamic moral hazard" in which a physician or facility has
invested in the latest technology and therefore is motivated to recommend
testing or treatment using this technology, even if lower-cost alternatives
are available, knowing that the decision will not affect the patient.2 5
Expanding technologies have led to a wider scope of insurance coverage,
which in turn has
led to even greater moral hazard caused by both patient
6
and physician.
The third, related cause of moral hazard in health insurance is the
inequity of information between the insurer and individual insureds. The
insurer cannot know going in the risks involved with insuring a given
individual. 27 Additionally, specific episodes of illness are not contractible
and insurers are empowering insureds to spend their money without direct
control over how that money is spent for most outpatient servicesi2 The
insurer may, and generally does, have greater information relating to which
providers have better medical outcomes for specific diagnoses and
treatments, as well as which treatment options have proven most
successful. 2 Traditionally, this information has not been shared for a
variety of reasons, including avoiding the perceived endorsement of better
providers, as well as a lack of solid actionable data. 3 Lack of solid
actionable data is due to inflation, increased medical charges due to aging
populations, and higher demand for services.
A fourth cause of moral hazard is the fact that today the insured patient is
insulated from the costs involved with treatment decisions. This goes handin-hand with the inequity of information just discussed, but even if there
were perfect information sharing regarding the treatment options and their
in UNCERTAIN TIMES: KENNETH ARROW AND THE CHANGING EcONOMICS OF HEALTH CARE

108 (Peter J. Hammer et al., eds., 2003).
23. See id.
24. Id. at 107.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. French & Kamboj, supranote 18, at 62.
28. Vera-Hernandez, supra note 17, at 671.

29. BERNARD HANDEL, INT'L FOUND. EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS, NEW DIRECTIONS IN
WELFARE PLAN BENEFITS: INSTITUTING HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT PROGRAMS 51-52
(1984).
30. Id. at 57-59.
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efficacy, the insured patient is not price-sensitive to these options.
Essentially, once the insurance is paid for, it is equivalent to a reduction in
the price of medical care. 3' Particularly in the situation of plans with flat
copayments for physician office visits, often the insured will pay the same
flat amount regardless of what is done while in that office.
The biggest cause of this insulation from the costs of medical care is that
patients are spending other peoples' money when they consult the doctor.
The actual out-of-pocket costs to the patient are minimal. One study
showed that patients in hospitals pay only five cents out-of-pocket for every
dollar they spend of insurance funds.3 To show the effect this has on the
behavior of patients, various analogies to other types of purchases have
been made. For example, if an individual could purchase a car and pay only
a S500 deductible and 20% of the remaining sticker price for a small
premium payment, that individual would be incentivized to make maximum
use of this coverage.33 The difference in price between the individual's
portion of the cost of a $15,000 Hyundai (S3400) and a $30,000 Chevy
($6400) may not be sufficient to encourage appropriate purchasing.
C. The Optimal Insurance. A Ilorld Without Moral Hazard
One approach to reduce moral hazard involves removing the event being
insured against from the control over the insured individual. 4 With health
insurance, cost of treatment is partially determined by unpredictable
episodes of illness, although the cost is also affected by the individual's
choice of doctor and facility, as well as by the individual's willingness to
use medical services. 35 Again, it has been shown that the presence of
insurance affects these decisions, with demand for healthcare and therefore
36
cost of treatment increasing with the presence of insurance.
The ideal insurance would provide protection against unpredictable costs
of necessary medical care. Kenneth Arrow proposed that in an optimal
system, a physician would be paid according to the degree of benefit to the

31.

Cheah & Doessel, supra note 10, at 567 (citing KENNETH J. ARRO\\, Information and

Economic Behaviour, in 4 COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNFTH J. ARROW. THE ECONOMICS OF

l\FORNiATION, at 148 (K.J. Arrow & Harvard University Press eds., 1985).
32. JOHN C. GOODMAN & GERALD L. MUSGRAVE, C \TO INST., PATIENT POWER: SOLVING
AMFRICA'S HEALTH CARE CRISIS vii (1992).
33. See. cg., HENDERSON, supra note 2, at 2. Henderson uses a theoretical "food card"
to make the same point: ifa food card were provided by an individual's employer and after a
deductible of S250 the individual only paid 20 ° 0 of her food expenses, the incentive to
purchase sensibly as a good consumer would be minimal.
34. Arrow, supra note 1,at 961.

35.

Id.

36.

Id.
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patient. 37 Presumably this scheme would make payment contingent on the
medical outcomes for the particular patient. But as Arrow properly noted,
this would shift the risk from the patient to the physician; because
physicians have been shown to be extremely risk averse, it is probably more
appropriate for insurance to pool this risk. 8 In any case, the insurance plan
should be designed so that medical care is always undertaken when the
expected utility, taking into consideration
the probabilities of positive
3
outcomes, exceeds the expected cost.

D. Moral Hazard. The Real- World Data

In the years leading up to the late-1970s, it was considered an intuitive
but unproven assumption that cost-sharing affected the quantity of medical
services sought. 4" The Nixon administration funded a $180 million, multiyear study by the RAND Corporation to conduct a controlled experiment to
determine the effect of cost-sharing on demand for medical services, which
ended in 1982. 4' This experiment allowed RAND to become the sole
insurer for 5809 people, each randomly assigned to different insurance
plans with co-insurance ranging from zero to 95%.42 The health of the
participants was tested at the beginning and end of the experiment with selfreporting questionnaires and physical exams.41
The data derived from the RAND study confirmed the previous
assumption: higher cost-sharing does reduce spending on outpatient
medical services as measured by total cost of treatment.44 With health
differences and other variables controlled for, the plan with 95% cost
sharing (amounting to a $1000 family deductible due to the out-of-pocket
maximum) showed spending that was just 66% of the amount used by those
with no coinsurance. 45 These numbers were similar regardless of income
level, indicating that more affluent people are as influenced by cost-sharing
as those with lower incomes."' Further, the study found these differentials
between free care and cost-sharing continued after five years, which

37.

Id. at 964.

38.
39.
40.

Id. at 964-65.
Id. at 965.
Emmett B. Keeler, Effects of Cost Sharing On Use oj Medical Services and Health,

MED. PRACTICE MGMT. 317 (Summer 1992), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/

RP I 14/RP1 1 14.pdf.
41. Id. at317-318.
42. Id.
43. Id. at318.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Keeler, supra note 40, at 318.
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indicates that cost-sharing is not less effective over time due to unmet
need.47
The study also concluded that cost-sharing had no significant impact on
the health of those involved; in fact, the physicians involved were
disappointed to find the low level of improvement resulting from increased
visits.'" With few exceptions, those receiving free care had substantially the
same health levels as those having to pay a portion of the costs. 49 Notably,
one exception was where the plan completely paid for vision care (often not
covered by medical plans), which resulted in participants enjoying bettercorrected vision. 50 Likewise, the data appeared to indicate that the
increased number of visits induced by free care led to better case-finding
and management of hypertension, although at a cost of $300 per year in
1982 dollars. 5' However, later analysis showed that more than half the
conferred by a one-time
benefit of free care for high blood pressure was
52
screening examination at a fraction of the cost.

Additional analyses of the RAND data built upon the initial study's
conclusions. An analysis by six RAND economists in 1987 showed that not
only does increased cost-sharing reduce expenditures on medical services,
but also that such cost-shaing does not lead to patients foregoing
treatment. 3 This directly contradicted the hypothesis that less favorable
coverage would actually increase total costs by deterring necessary
preventive care and increasing later hospitalizations. 54 In fact, the
economists determined "we can rule out clinically significant benefits from
It appeared that
the additional services in the free fee-for-service plan.
the introduction of cost-sharing reduced the number of visits and therefore
not prevent patients receiving the
the total costs of treatment, but did
56
appropriate treatment when needed.
The greatest reduction in treatment costs occurred between the zero
coinsurance rate and the 25% level, with reduced gains (reductions) at each
subsequent level of coinsurance. 57 Interestingly, however, cost-sharing has
little, if any, effect on utilization of inpatient medical services. The RAND
"

47.
48.
4L)

Id.
Id. at 319.

Id.

50, Id.
51. Id.
52. Willard G. Manning et. al., Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care:
Evidence from a Randomized Experiment, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 251, 265 (1987).
53. Id. at 258.
54. Id at 263-65.
55. Id. at 265.
56. Id at 259
57. Id.
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study showed that although cost-sharing had substantial effects on the use
of outpatient services, the result was the opposite for inpatient services. 5'
Additionally, the data showed that the level of inappropriate use of inpatient
medical services (23%) was the same across all of the coinsurance levels.5 9
It would seem, therefore, that inpatient services are more appropriately seen
as complementary to outpatient services than as a substitute.
Similar results were achieved when RAND analyzed the effect of costsharing on utilization of prescription drugs using a four-site study with a
variety of cost-sharing plans randomly assigned to participants. The study
found an increase of 60% in dollar-value of utilization of prescription drugs
between the lowest coinsurance plan and the plan with a 95% coinsurance. 6
Further, the average number of prescriptions purchased per person per year
increased for enrollees in the free plan, with the 95% plan participants
61
spending only slightly over half as much on prescription drugs.
Importantly, the study noted that higher spending was caused by this
increased quantity as opposed to a difference in price per prescription. 62
III. METHODS OF CONTROLLING MORAL HAZARD fN HEALTH INSURANCE
4. HistoricalMethods

Historically, to minimize moral hazard, insurers have experimented with
encouraging optimal utilization of medical services by applying both carrot
and stick to both provider and patient. As discussed in Part II above, health
insurance, without more, generally lacks incentives for either patients or
providers to seek or provide cost-efficient medical care.
Insurers first attempted to control moral hazard through supply-side
methods, including utilization review and management (UM/UR). UM/UR
charges the insurer (or claims administrator for self-insured plans) with
reviewing specific treatment plans recommended by physicians
prospectively, concurrently, or subsequently.63 This review is typically
done on inpatient admissions or surgical procedures to ensure the necessity
and appropriateness of recommended procedure(s), facility, and length of

58.
59.

Manning et al., supra note 52, at 259.
Keeler, supra note 40, at 318.

60.

ARLEEN LIEBOWITZ ET AL., RAND CORP, THE DEMAND FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUGS AS

A FUNCTION OF COST-SHARING

13 (Oct. 1985), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/

notes/2005/N2278.pdf.
61. Id. at 13.
62. Id.
63. HANDEL, supra note 29, at 51.
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stay. 4 To the extent the procedures are not approved, they will not be
reimbursed by the insurance plan, thereby creating a great incentive for
providers to make sure that approval is received. A related method is to
audit provider charges once billed in order to ensure that only necessary
treatments are reimbursed. 65 This type of review program reduces moral
hazard by inserting an additional party, interested in the costs, into the
decision-making process, as well as by developing a greater dataset to be
used in future plan design.66
A second method of controlling moral hazard on the supply side is the
imposition of fee schedules and negotiated discounted payment rates to
physicians. 67 From an economic perspective, at a lower given price,
producers will supply a lower quantity of the service. This means, for
example, that if a physician office visit previously charged at $100 is now
discounted to $75, the physician will be less willing to provide the same
number of visits, thereby limiting the opportunity of patients to over-utilize
such visits. 68 In reality this theory has not always been borne out in the
medical arena, as practices have been able to increase productivity and
reduce internal costs such that a higher number of visits can be provided at
the reduced rate, thereby achieving previous total billing amounts.
However, this method has been successful in leading medical practices to
use lower-cost providers to more efficiently provide the same services once
only performed by physicians. 69 This reduces moral hazard by removing
some of the self-interest of providers to recommend services that may not
be absolutely necessary but traditionally would have been thrown-in when
fully covered by insurance and performed by physicians.70
A third but related method of controlling moral hazard from the supplyside is the notion of prepaid medical care. This type of system can take the
form of capitation payments to primary care providers ("PCPs"), in which
the PCP is paid a given per-enrollee per-month rate and is expected to
provide whatever care is necessary to the assigned enrollees for that limited
pot of money. 7' This motivates the PCP to provide care efficiently in order
64. Id.
65. Id. at 52.
66. Id.
67.
68.

Id.
See generally Warren Greenberg, Demand. Supply, and Information in Health Care

and Other Industries, in INCENTIVES VS. CONTROLS IN HEALTH POLICY: BROADENING THE

DEBATE, supra note 10, 96-97. The supply of physicians' services has increased since the
1960s, making it easier for the payer to negotiate with physicians' groups and hospitals to
have greater bargaining power.
69. Id. at 97.
70. Id. at 97-98.
71.
Elizabeth Docteur & Howard Oxley, Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Health-
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to maximize profit and will minimize unnecessary care because it will cut
into the PCP's revenue.7 2 This function is often linked to a requirement that
the PCP perform a 'gatekeeper" function in providing referrals to
specialists, as a pool of money is held back until year-end, at which point
the PCP is paid out of the reserve to the extent that specialist referrals are
minimized. Although they have largely proven successful in containing
moral hazard, these capitation systems have encountered numerous
problems, not the least of which is resistance from providers who are
notoriously risk-averse and see capitation as a major shift of risk from the
insurer to providers.73
Turning to consumers, in the early 1970s there was a fear that imposing
cost-sharing and other incentives to patients as consumers was "penny-wise
and pound-foolish."" 4 This fear resulted from the theory that controlling
predictable utilization would lead to higher long-term costs through
increased hospitalizations. 75 But as indicated above, the RAND study and
subsequent analyses clearly showed that while cost-sharing could reduce
moral hazard and the costs of treatment, it did not indicate any significant
effect on the health of the participants."
Almost immediately after the RAND survey results were compiled and
disseminated, insurers and employers began to increase cost-sharing
attributes of their plan offerings. For example, in 1983, the year after the
study was completed, Xerox Corporation raised its coinsurance from 0% to
20% and increased its annual deductible from a flat $100 to 1% of salary.77
Its employee communications that year cited the RAND study as the
primary reason for the changes, noting the potential for savings on medical
services without risking adverse effects on health.,
HMOs, originally conceived of as a type of closed-panel prepaid medical
plan, likewise began adding or increasing copayment requirements for
physician visits and hospital stays. 7 9 While few HMOs in 1982 required
any copayment, and those that did were generally $5 or less, 83% of HMO
members paid physician visit copayments of between $5 and $10 by 1990.80

Care Systems: Lessons From The Reform Experience, in 9 OECD HEALTH WORKING PAPERS
30 (2003), available at http://ww..oecd.org/dataoecd/5/53/22364122.pdf
72. Id.
73. See Arrow, supra note 1, at 964.
74. Keeler, supra note 40, at 317.
75. Id.

76.
77.

Id. at 319.
Manning et al., supra note 52, at 272, n. 51.

78.
79.

Id.
Keeler, supra note 40, at 320.

80.

Id.
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Perhaps the best data regarding the effectiveness of cost-sharing on
reducing moral hazard effects on utilization without producing adverse
health effects come from the state Medicaid programs. Many of these
programs initially provided coverage for outpatient services, including
physician visits, with no copayment required. 81 In 1972, California was one
of the first states to experiment with the use of copayments for physician
visits as a way to control high utilization.82 The study indicated that
increasing the copayment from $0 to $1 per visit yielded a volume
3
Although federal law requires that
reduction in number of visits by 8%.8
any copayments in Medicaid be "nominal," many states followed this
example and implemented copayment requirements in the 1990s. 4 In 2001,
Utah was experiencing high utilization that was ever-increasing, but after
implementing $2 copayments for physician visits in November of that year,
utilization of such visits plummeted 70% by February 2003.85
Other than cost-sharing, the 1980s saw other attempts to rein in the
effects of moral hazard and cost increases in general. One such method was
the introduction of health promotion and employee assistance programs
("EAPs"). Such programs are intended both to educate employees on
healthy lifestyle choices and to intervene earlier in the process, before
actual medical care is needed. 6 For example, EAPs can provide education
about the dangers of alcoholism, provide counseling, and present
alternatives to more-expensive medical services, which leads to reduced
absenteeism and lower health care claims costs. 8 7 Employers can provide
onsite fitness facilities, arrange for low-cost health club memberships, or
organize employee communication programs to encourage greater physical
fitness and help keep employees out of the medical system."
The one 1960s-style insurance contract that remains today is the
Medicare indemnity policy, which lacks much of the utilization
management and other cost-containing measures found in private

81.
See, e.g., LEIGHTON KU ET AL., THE EFFECTS OF COPAYMENTS ON THE USE OF
MEDICAL SERVICES AND PRESCRIPTION DRUGS IN UTAH'S MEDICAID PROGRAM, CTR. ON
BLI_)GET AND POLICY PRIORITIES 3 (Nov. 22, 2004).

82.
CARE:

L.

JAY HELMS ET AL., RAND CORP., COPAYMENTS AND DEMAND FOR MEDICAL
EXPERIENCE
Ix-%
(1978), available at
THE
CALIFORNIA
MEDICAID

http:/ xww. rand.org/pubs/
reports/2005/R2 167.pdf.
83. Id. at 16.
84. Ku, supra note 81, at 9.
95. Id. at 5-6.
86. HANDEL, supra note 29, at 53.

87.

Id.

88.

Id. at 54, 233-34.
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insurance."' Traditionally, this policy has addressed moral hazard by
leaving beneficiaries vulnerable to virtually unlimited cost-sharing,
particularly for long-term illnesses." Until recent changes, Medicare did
not provide coverage for outpatient prescription drugs, an excellent example
of predictable costs whose coverage is contrary to pure insurance theory. 9'
But now with the addition of a prescription drug benefit through Medicare
Part D, this last bastion of old-style insurance contract has bowed to modem
economic and political realities."
B. Modern Trends in Controlling Moral Hazard
Beginning with the greater increases experienced near the end of the
1990s, insurers and employers again began to search in earnest for ways to
control medical care costs. including those caused by moral hazard. On the
provider side, the near-universality of managed care ensured that a majority
of surgeries and hospitalizations wsere subject to UM/UR restrictions.9 3
Cost reductions can be achieved on the supply-side through restraints by
properly coaxing providers a"vay from excessive utilization of hightechnology resources to less costly and more effective alternatives, but
insurers have had difficulty finding this state.1 4 Risk-sharing with providers
has been tried. with or without capitation, as has imposition of additional
controls and limitations on provider autonomy through standards of care
However, such restrictions can lead to enormous
requirements. 95
administrative costs and dissatisfaction by both providers and patients.96
Employers have been able to achieve a certain level of savings through
more advanced purchasing methods, many of which have been brought over
from other areas of their businesses. For example, Hewitt Associates,
working with 350 large employers, established several initiatives to
improve purchasing efficiency, sufficient to reduce annual cost increases by
1-2%. 9' Total savings experienced over a two-year period have been 1089.
90.
91.

GLiF-D, supra note 22, at 106
Id.
Id.

92. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066. This Act provided, among other things, for the
addition of a new optional prescription drug benefit for Medicare beneficiaries, offered
through private insurers rather than through traditional Medicare carriers paying on an
indemnity basis.
93. GLIED, supra note 22, at 108.
94. Roger Feldman, The Abilitv of Managed Care to Control Health Care Costs: How
Much Is Enough?, 26 J. HEALTH CARE FIN. 17 (Spring 2000).

95.

Id. at 17.

96. Id. at 18-19.
97. Hewitt Associates,
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30% by using data-driven procurement to better align health care
purchasing for a given employee population with more efficient insurance
providers and administrators in various regions."
In recent years, it has become clear to insurers and employers that to cap
the seemingly ever-increasing costs of medical insurance, the
insured/employee must be engaged as a consumer rather than merely a
patient receiving care. This trend began with the introduction of health
promotion programs, but has increased as employers have sought to partner
with employees to control costs. 99 Because employees at least partially
"feel the pain" of medical insurance cost increases through rising
premiums, increased cost-sharing, and even lower salary increases, it is also
in their best economic interest to become involved in controlling these
costs. 101)
First, in order to engage employees in their medical care decisions,
employers have continued to increase the portion of costs that employees
pay. Employers have learned that cost awareness can cause employees to
take greater accountability for their health care choices and this awareness
comes from cost-sharing. Additionally, behavioral research has shown that
employee behavior is best impacted by making financial incentives and
penalties visible to employees.""()
In recent years, a majority of employers have increased cost-sharing with
employees by raising employee contributions, deductibles, and
copayments/coinsurance." 2 In fact, data from Hewitt Associates indicates
that over the most recent five years, employee contributions have increased
126% and employees are now paying approximately 19% of the overall cost
of health care, compared to approximately 13% in 1995.1 3 Average annual
http: 1 ww. hewitt.com/hewk itt/servces, healthcare/ subhealthcare/how-to-impact.htn
visited Feb. 28, 2006).
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Anxiet'y, May 2005, http://ww.towersperrin.com/hrsen ices, ebcache/towers/TPMonitor/
jsp/showdoc.jsp?webc=TPMonitor/2005/05/articles/mon article_0505A.htm (last visited
Feb. 28, 2006).
101. See Hewitt Associates, supra note 97.
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individual deductibles are nov $300 for PPO plans, compared to $100 in
such plans in 1990.1'4
Similar cost-sharing increases have been implemented in employersponsored retiree health plans. A study by Brandeis University in 2001-02
found that spending on prescription drugs had been increasing at a rate of
15 - 20% every year since 1990, but that this trend could be dampened with
increased cost-sharing. 0 5 For example, by doubling copayments from $5 to
$10 for single-tier (all drugs require the same copay amount) prescription
drug plans, overall drug spending is reduced by 22%, attributable partially
to shifting costs to retirees, but largely due to decreases in utilization. 106
Overall, retiree plans with more aggressive cost-sharing (i.e., at least
20% higher copay requirements for retail vs. mail-order and brand vs.
generics) experience, on average, a 13.3% reduction in spending per
prescription and approximately 18.7% reduction in total annual costs per
member to the plan sponsor. 0 7 A substantial portion of this savings (55%)
is attributable to the cost shifted to the retiree, but approximately 45% is
attributable to reduced utilization of higher-cost alternatives when more
cost-effective drugs are available.'"
Another form of cost-sharing that puts the decision about what insurance
coverage is appropriate into the individual's hands is called "fixed-dollar
premium contribution." This form is a type of defined-contribution strategy
whereby the employer sets the level of its contribution, then allows its
employees to determine how this contribution will be spent.'0 9 While this
type of contribution stratept has not yet been widely adopted, the
experience of one large employer, the University of California ("UC"),
indicates it has been successful in increasing employee awareness of the
true cost of coverage and garnering large savings." 0 In 1994, UC
2005, 6 (Nov. 17, 2004).
104. Id.
105. Cindy Parks Thomas et. al., Impact of Health Plan Design and Management On
Retiree's Drug Use and Spending, HEALTH AFF. W408, W408 (Dec. 4, 2002).

106.

Id. at W409.

107. See id. at W414. Exhibit 4 compares the average annual spending per prescription
for less aggressive cost sharing at S45 versus $39 for more aggressive cost sharing, which is
a 13.3% reduction. Exhibit 4 also shows the average annual overall cost per member to plan
sponsor to be $1421 for less aggressive cost sharing compared to $1155 for more aggressive
cost sharing, which is a $18.7% difference.
108. See id. (stating that total savings per member is $266, $145 of which is attributable
to members paying more out of pocket; therefore, 55% is attributable to increased cost
sharing, and the remaining 45% to more efficient purchasing by members or reduced use of
higher-cost alternatives).
109. Thomas C. Buchmueller, Does .4 Fixed-Dollar Premium Contribution Lower
Spending?, 17 HEALTH AFF. 228, 228 (Nov/Dec. 1998).
110. Id.
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announced that it would limit its premium contribution to the cost of the
least-expensive of its four plan offerings, while employees who chose the
more expensive plans would pay the difference."'
In the first year, 45% of the employees switched to the lowest-cost plan
to pay zero premiums.' 12 Over the next 4 years, each of the four plans
actually reduced the premiums they charged in an effort to gain enrollment,3
with total real prices after inflation dropping by 20-25% in that period."
Because the shifting occurred to more restrictive HMO plans, utilization
was reduced and total health spending for UC's employees dropped 9.3% in
each of the first two years." 4 In the end, however, plans began to
experience adverse selection issues (a concept discussed more fully below
in Part IV) and at least one plan was raising premiums," 15 indicating that
additional work in design and implementation of this type of plan will be
necessary for success in the long-term.
A related concept introduced by a few large employers such as Dell Inc.
and FedEx Corp. go by various names: "cafeteria," "menu" or "a la carte"
plan selection. This method essentially offers one base plan, usually a PPO,
with optional riders that allow employees to "buy-up" to additional options,
16
meaning one base plan can have as many as 100 different variations."
Rather than the employer choosing a one-size-fits-all plan, the employee is
able to customize the plan to best suit her needs.
An example of a base plan and options, provided by Hewitt Associates,
follows with these basic characteristics: 17
* $1000 annual deductible (optional $750, S500, $250)
* 80%/60% in-network/out-of-network coinsurance (optional select
network with 100%/80%/60%; $25 or $15 copays for office visits)
* $10/$20/$40 prescription drug copays (optional $10/20/30;
$5/15/30)
Because of the communication challenges and potential confusion to
employees presented by this increased flexibility, these plans are generally
offered using online modeling tools that show estimated costs under various
plan options and health conditions.' 8 The upside of these plans is that

111.

Id.at 229.

112.

Id. at 230 (In 1994, "Health Net gained more than 9,000 new UC enrollees").

113.

Id.

114.
115.

Id. at 231.
Buchmueller, supra note 109, at 233-34.
116. Sarah Rubenstein, Buying Health Insurance, Cafeteria Sr'le, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19,
2004, available at http://webreprints.djreprints.com/1095980804106.html; see also Health
Care Expectations 2004, supra note 9, at 25.
117. Health Care Expectations 2004, supra note 9, at 25.
118. Rubenstein, supra note 116.
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employers can offer higher le\els of coverage but, similar to fixed-premium
plans, the employees will pay the full additional costs for their choices.'' 9
Approximately 13% of large employers have adopted such plans through
2004, either as an additional option or full-replacement for existing options,
although it does not appear these plans will see
much additional adoption at
0
this point due to their perceived complexity.12
Aside from cost-sharing, the provision of greater information to
employees is perhaps the largest trend among employers for reducing moral
hazard. Employers are providing "decision-support tools," including webbased tools, to provide greater information to employees at all stages of the
health care purchase process, from plan selection to treatment.' 2' For
example, as better data becomes available, many employers are rolling out
access to cost and quality data for providers and facilities. As of 2004, only
about 12% of large employers had begun providing this information to22
employees, but an additional 65% indicated intent to adopt in the future.
To reinforce this approach. some employers have or are considering either
using a select network of providers and hospitals with the best cost and
quality data. or tiering
copayments based on whether one of these preferred
123
providers is used.
Perhaps the most far-reaching change to implement consumerism in
employer-sponsored health benefit plans is the consumer-directed plan,
discussed in the following section.

IV. CONSUMER-DIRECTED HEALTH PLANS: A POSSIBLE ANSWER TO
MORAL HAzARD?
A. What are Consumer-DirectedHealth Plans?
One theory to combat the problem of moral hazard involves enabling
employees to purchase medical care as if they were doing so with their own
money. 114 Employers have been wary of going as far as true defined
contribution plans, in which the employee has in essence a "voucher" for a
certain amount and then is able to spend that money on his own selected

119.

Id.

120. Health Care Expectations 2004, supra note 9, at 2.
121.
Press Release, Watson Wyatt, Employees Facing New Plan Designs, Significant
Benefit Changes During Open Enrollment Season (Sep. 27, 2004), available at

http://www.watsonwyatt.com/us/news/press.asp?ID= 13656.
122.

Health CareExpectations 2004, supra note 9.

123.

Id. at 45, 46.

124. Gregg Mauro, Consumer-Driven Healthcare: Cost Shift or Paradigm Shift?, 145
CONFERENCE BOARD EXECUTIVE ACTION I (Apr. 2005).
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25

plan.1
However, a major step down that path is the consumer-directed plan,
which provides the individual with a high-deductible health plan, as well as
a medical spending account. 126 This account, funded by the employer plansponsor and typically in the range of half the value of the deductible, is then
used by that individual to pay for medical care.' 27 A typical design of such
plans according to Hewitt is:, 128
A PPO plan, with 90% in-network/70% out-of-network coinsurance
* $2000 annual deductible
* $1000 health reimbursement account funded by the employer, with
roll-over
* Leaving a $1000 gap between the $1000 HRA and the $2000
deductible level
If the individual uses the full amount of the account, he is then liable for
the remaining amount of the deductible (the so-called "gap" in coverage)
before the PPO plan will begin paying anything. 29 On the other hand, if
the individual has medical costs that are less than the amount of the account
13
0
funded by the employer, this money will roll-over to subsequent years.
The rolled-over money can be used toward those subsequent years'
deductibles, and eventually, for individuals with low health care
expenditures, will
exceed the deductible and can be carried over indefinitely
3
into retirement.' '
In either case, the theory behind these consumer-directed health plans is
that the individual will spend the funded account as if it were his own
money, both to avoid getting to the "gap" in coverage and to carry over the
funds.11 This is the sought-after "consumerism" behavior that employers
are striving for, trying to get employees to act as consumers of healthcare
rather than beneficiaries.
Employer plan sponsors who have used
consumer-driven health plans ("CDHPs") as replacements for existing plans
have so far experienced savings under these plans, partially due to the
change in individuals' behavior. 3 3 However, if the employer only offers
125.

See generally id.

126.

Id.

127. Jon R. Gabel et. al., Employers" Contradictory, Views About Consumer-Driven
Health Care. Results From A National Survey, HEALTH AFF., W4-211 (Apr. 21, 2004).
128. Health Care Expectations 2004, supra note 9, at 24.
129. Kathleen Stoll & Peggy Denker, What's Wrong with Tax-Free Savings Accounts
for Health Care?, FAMILIES USA ISSUE BRIEF (Nov. 20, 2003), at 2, available at
http://www. familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/HSAsNov_2003foad.pdf.
130. Mauro, supra note 126, at 3
131. Stoll & Denker, supra note 129, at 2.
132. Id. at5.
133. Mauro, supra note 126, at 3, 4.
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the CDHP as an additional option alongside existing plans, the problem of
adverse selection can occur.
B. Adverse Selection - 11bat It Is and How It .4flects Health Plans
Adverse selection, like moral hazard, is a concern that must be addressed
by those designing health plans. However, unlike moral hazard, which
concerns the behavior of individuals once enrolled in a plan, adverse34
selection affects enrollment patterns among health plan offerings.1
Adverse selection is problematic on grounds of both efficiency and equity
among employees.' 35 Unless an employer plan sponsor intends to
completely replace all existing plans and offer only a CDHP, adverse
selection must be addressed.
As noted above in the Lniversity of California example, adverse
selection becomes an issue whenever there is competition between health
plans and employees must choose one.1 36 Individuals, acting rationally in
their own best interests, will alxavs choose the health plan that best suits
their own expected needs for health care coverage' 37 meaning that plan
options must be priced appropriately to minimize the effects of adverse
selection. 138 This is particularl true for plans such as CDHPs, which by
their very nature attract young. healthy individuals and are more likely to be
shunned by those who know they w ill need to consume considerable health

care. 139
Economist Mark Pauly described the economic theory of adverse
selection and the stages that it typically follows.1 4 In the first stage, if
given a selection of health plan options, a lower-cost plan such as a CDHP
will disproportionately attract the employees who have had low utilization
under more traditional plans because low-risk consumers value generous
This very trend occurred when
coverage less than high-risk consumers.'
HMOs were first offered as an option alongside traditional indemnity plans
in the 1980s, with HMOs "picking off' low-risk (and thereby low-utilizing)
individuals with lower premiums to compensate for more restrictive
coverage.
134. Mark Pauly & Sean Nicholson, Adverse Consequences ofAdverse Selection, 24 J.
HEALTH POL. 921, 922 (Oct. 1999).

135.
136.
137.

See id. (describing the stages of adverse selection).
Buchmueller, supra note 109, at 233.
Pauly & Nicholson, supra note 134, at 922.

138.

Id. at 929.

139.
140.
141.
142.

Gabel et al., supra note 127, at W4-214.
See Pauly & Nicholson, supra note 134, at 922.
Id.at 922, 923.
Id. at 923, 925.
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As the higher-risk individuals remain with the more-generous, highercost plan, the claims experience of that plan is skewed toward these higherutilizing individuals, thereby increasing Costs. 14 3 This forces the generous
plan to raise premiums, eventually to the point that even higher-utilizing
individuals will choose the lower-cost alternative and at some point the
more generous plan is no longer economical to offer. 144 Pauly argues that
this cyclical pattern will continue, with low-risk individuals continually
seeking lower-cost plans and more generous plans becoming too expensive
to continue.,4 5
For CDHPs, there is not yet sufficient data to show conclusively that
these plans attract primarily low-isk individuals, but there is intuitiveness
to this hypothesis that requires the adverse selection issue to be addressed.
This has caused employers to look to CDHPs initially not so much as a
down the path of increasing a
cost-reducing proposition, but as one step
46
employees.1
among
consumerism
of
sense
C. Other Challenges to Consumer-Directed Health Care
The desire of employers to impose a sense of consumerism among
employees and to implement CDHPs as a method of increasing that
phenomenon faces several other challenges. One obstacle is the outright
resistance of some employees to any efforts perceived as cost-shifting
measures by employers.1 7 While employers try to enlist employees as
allies in controlling health care costs, surveys indicate that many employees
view such costs as the problem of employers and not something for which
they should be responsible. 4 s
Another challenge facing employers trying to introduce consumer-driven
plans is not only communicating the need for cost-containment, but also
thoroughly communicating how CDHPs work, why they are being
introduced, and why employees should consider such plans. Tami Tolzman
at 3M indicated that at locations where health benefits employees are able
to personally discuss these issues directly with employees, they have seen a
willingness of employees to consider the plan, as well as increased

143.
Id. at 922.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146. Tolzman interview, supra note 5.
147. See Press Release, Towers Perrin, Towers Perrin Survey Finds Consumer-Driven
Health Care Strategies Jeopardized by Employer and Employee Disconnects (Jun. 14, 2004),
available
at
http://www.towersperrin.com/hrservices/webcache/towers/UnitedStates/
press releases/2004 06 14/2004 06 14.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2006).
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enrollment. 14 Surveys indicate that effective communication not only
helps drive enrollment into such plans, but also increases reported
satisfaction of those already enrolled. ° One method that appears to be a
key to successful communications is to combine personal on-site meetings,
written communications, and a self-service web site that allows employees
51
to access the information in the way that best suits their needs.
A further challenge for CDHPs is the perception that once individuals
view the medical reimbursement account as their own money, they will
forego necessary treatment. Critics argue that this will lead to higher
medical costs in the long-run as employees shun lower costing preventative
care, but ultimately incur higher-costing hospitalizations.1 52 However,
employers can at least avoid the problem of foregone preventive care
services by excluding such services from the deductible and not applying
these costs to the account. 53 3M did just this with its custom-designed
CDHP and initial claims data has shown that for the enrolled population,
the average usage of preventive
services is the same in this plan as under its
54
other plan offerings. 1
D. Trends in Adopting Consumer-DirectedHealth Plans
Companies have been slow to adopt CDHPs, preferring to wait and see
what other companies that have adopted such plans experience. By 2002,
an estimated 1.5 million persons were enrolled in CDHPs offered by
employers or other private insurers, with expert projections of future
enrollment ranging from such plans comprising a "niche" to "50 percent of
the health care market."' 55 One encouraging trend has been that for
companies who adopted such plans, none reported a decline in enrollment
in CDHPs from the previous year. 56 In fact, companies have generally had
success in expanding enrollment in subsequent years, with companies such
as Intel reporting a threefold increase in their CDHP enrollment in the
second year.' 57
In 2004, the number of large employers offering consumer-driven

149. Tolzman interview, supra note 5.
150. See Thomas R. Beauregard, Employees Hold Key To Health Care Decisions,
WORKSPAN, Sept. 2001, at 48-49.
151. Tolzman interview, supra note 5.
152. Stoll & Denker, supra note 129, at 5.
153. Tolzman interview, supra note 5.
154. Id.
155. Jon R. Gabel et al., Consumer-Driven Health Plans: Are Thev More Than Talk
Now?, HEALTH AFF. W395, W404 (Nov. 20, 2002).
156. Mauro, supra note 126, at 4.
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models of some variation doubled from 6% to 12%,with an additional 54%
of large employers seriously considering adopting such plans in the near
future. 158 Whether additional employers continue to adopt CDHPs will
likely be dependent on the experience of those who already have.
3M Company, headquartered in St. Paul, Minnesota, first offered its own
custom-designed CDHP to its employees during the 2003 enrollment season
for the year 2004.159 This plan is self-insured by 3M (as are almost all of
3M's health plan offerings), with Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota
acting as claims administrator and providing the PPO network. 6 ° The plan
plans and the
is offered as an additional option alongside traditional PPO
16 1
design of the plan is a PPO plan with 80% coverage after:
Individual: $750 medical savings account, $750 "gap"
(total $1500 deductible)
$1500 medical savings account, $1500 "gap"
Family:
($3000 deductible)
In the first year of enrollment, 3M's CDHP plan saw enrollment of
approximately 500 employees, out of approximately 39,000 employees
nationwide.1 62 In the 2004 enrollment for the 2005 plan year, 3M did not
actively encourage employees to enroll in the plan and did not offer
incentives to drive enrollment there. 63 As a result, enrollment grew by
only 10% to approximately 550 employees, perhaps predictably so, but
below the company's expectations. 64 Also predictably, the employees
enrolled are more heavily weighted toward single employees, with
doing so as "employee-only," rather
approximately 62% of those enrolled
65
dependents.'
plus
employees
than
V. CONCLUSION

Moral hazard is a very real concern for employers and insurers
attempting to control rising health care costs. This is particularly true in
employer-sponsored health care plans, for which employees have
traditionally been charged only a very small fraction of premiums and have
been responsible for only a small fraction of actual billed charges for the
treatments they seek. With very little "skin in the game," employees' real
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Health Care Expectations 2004, supra note 9, at 23.
Tolzman interview, supra note 5.
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cost of medical services is effectively reduced to whatever the minimal
copayment may be, such that following standard supply-and-demand
theory, the quantity of treatment sought is greater than it would be
otherwise.
One answer to controlling the problem of moral hazard is to increase a
sense of consumerism among enrollees. If employees begin to spend
money on medical services as if it were their own rather than the freewheeling spending that can arise from a sense of spending other peoples'
money, moral hazard can be reduced. It is not yet clear whether consumerdirected health plans will have this affect on overall populations of
employees, but initial data seems to indicate that for those currently
enrolled in such plans, their behavior (as measured by utilization of medical
services) is altered. Additional experience will be required to make a final
assessment on CDHPs, but employers cannot sustain the status quo of everincreasing medical costs - clearly something must be done.
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